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Deregulation and Restructuring 
in Telecommunications Services in 
the United States and Germany
Rosemary Batt
Cornell University
Owen Darbishire
University of Oxford
The telecommunications services industry provides a particularly
useful and interesting lens for considering the issue of mutual learning
between the United States and Germany.  As noted in Chapter 1 to this
volume, most learning in the field of industrial relations has tended to
be a one-way street, with U.S. researchers and practitioners advocating
the replication of successful components of the “German model,” such
as the apprenticeship system or works councils, which undergird high
levels of skill and productivity in manufacturing.  The experience of
the telecommunications industry, however, provides the opportunity
for Germany also to learn from the United States because the United
States continues to lead the world in providing high-quality universal
service.  Mutual learning is particularly important in this industry
because it employs 1–2 percent of the workforce in both countries
(Katz 1997) and provides a critical infrastructure for the competitive-
ness of firms and “information-based” economies.
Historically and currently, the leadership role of the United States
in telecommunications grows out of its technological innovations, with
early pioneering work in information technologies and systems engi-
neering at AT&T’s Bell Labs and with the later deployment of cellular,
satellite, and other advanced technologies by new entrants such as
Microwave Communications Inc. (MCI).  The availability of alterna-
tive wireless communications systems from MCI and others, in turn,
convinced U.S. regulators that the AT&T monopoly was not viable,
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leading to deregulation of the long-distance and equipment markets by
1984.1   In response to deregulation and new low-cost competitors,
AT&T reoriented its corporate strategies and structures to serve differ-
entiated market segments, invested heavily in fiber-optic cable and dig-
ital transmission and switching systems, and reengineered operating
systems.  These innovations brought significant cost reductions in
equipment and long-distance service; dramatic improvements in
response time, quality, and speed of transmission; and diversity of
product offerings.  Business customers, who were heavy users of
equipment and long distance, particularly benefited.  In anticipation of
local deregulation (finally legislated in 1996), the regional Bell operat-
ing companies (RBOCs) mimicked AT&T’s strategies.  The U.S. case,
therefore, serves as an example of how organizational restructuring
improved performance of an industry that is vital to national economic
competitiveness (both directly and as an important input into other
goods- and service-producing industries). 
By contrast, in spite of a historically high level of technological
competence within Deutsche Telekom (Telekom), the nature and path
of adjustment in response to the pressures of competition and reform
have been significantly different, and slower.  Deutsche Telekom was
privatized in 1994 but still retained a monopoly in providing telephone
and cable TV.   Deployment of digital systems considerably lags
behind that in the United States, and consumers receive slower service
and fewer product offerings and pay higher prices.  Telekom has strug-
gled to reorganize itself by copying the corporate strategies, organiza-
tional structures, and work practices of U.S. firms.  
Because of the slower pace of reform, however, Telekom also
stands to learn from the mistakes made in the United States, where
deregulation has led to increased inequality among consumers and
workers.  For consumers, the restructuring has benefited businesses
because they no longer pay rates that subsidize universal residential
service.  Both business and high-end retail customers can take advan-
tage of falling prices for long-distance calling, high-speed networks, or
enhanced features such as voice messaging.  For lower-income con-
sumers, however, the basic costs of local service have risen, and these
consumers are less likely to be able to take advantage of new products
or enhanced features, even if they are less costly than before (Keefe
and Boroff 1994, p. 318).  For labor, restructuring has not only dis-
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placed employees and reduced union strength, but it has also created
more unequal labor market conditions both within and between union
and nonunion segments.  To the extent that Germany wishes to pre-
serve equality for consumers and workers, this chapter provides an
analysis of how inequality in U.S. outcomes has occurred.  
The United States stands to learn from Germany as well.  In
response to real and anticipated deregulation, former Bell companies
downsized rapidly, depleting their embedded skill base, demoralizing
their workforce, and paying large severance or early retirement pack-
ages.  As an unintended consequence, those packages subsidized the
labor costs of competitors because competitors often hired former Bell
employees whose pension and health insurance were already covered
by their retirement packages.  Moreover, from 1996 on, Bell compa-
nies failed to anticipate the explosion in demand for Internet access and
new products, and they found themselves understaffed and scrambling
to fill vacancies for skilled employees.2  This chapter demonstrates how
the slower pace and continued monopoly status of Telekom allowed it
the opportunity to retrain its workforce and shift employees from tradi-
tional to growth segments of the market without incurring the substan-
tial costs of turnover and displacement, which negatively affect both
management and labor.
These differences in paths to restructuring are more striking
because U.S. and German telecommunications monopolists have quite
similar starting points.  This similarity is in contrast to manufacturing,
where mass-production systems in the United States were considerably
more developed than in Germany.  Historically, most countries oper-
ated public telephone monopolies with quite similar organizational
structures.  These companies were highly regulated, quasi-public enter-
prises providing a basic service to the public.  While Deutsche Telekom
operated as part of the Bundespost, which included the national post,
bank, and telecommunications, under the auspices of the Federal Min-
ister of Posts and Telecommunications, AT&T was regulated by the
(functionally similar) Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
Generally, telephone companies were large bureaucratic organizations
offering lifetime employment with high wages and benefits to employ-
ees who either considered themselves public servants or who were offi-
cially part of the civil service.  In other words, the internal labor market
rules governing work and employment relations in different countries
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(beyond just the United States and Germany) appear to have been
remarkably similar.  Equally, unionization rates in the industry were
very high among eligible workers.  Under these circumstances, one
might expect the United States, Germany, and other countries to follow
similar paths to deregulation, with similar corporate strategic responses
and stakeholder outcomes.
Other unique features of the industry argue for the adoption of par-
allel adjustment paths among countries.  To be globally competitive,
most former national telecommunications monopolies need to pursue,
and have pursued, joint ventures in order to enter each others’ markets,
such as AT&T with its World Partners and Deutsche Telekom with
France Télécom and Sprint.  These companies are laying global net-
works of cable to provide integrated voice, video, and data services to
worldwide customers.  The integrated nature, or “systemness,” of net-
work technology requires compatibility of systems across regional and
national boundaries.  Moreover, because of the concentrated structure
of the industry in each country, in which former monopolists continue
to be the dominant players, the strategic choices of a handful of players
significantly shape the direction of industrial change.  The key players,
who include Deutsche Telekom, AT&T, and the regional Bell operating
companies in the United States, closely watch and learn from each
other’s experience.  In contrast to manufacturing, where decentralized
production units are more viable, this predilection to watch and learn
again increases the likelihood that the transfer of technology and the
borrowing of work organization strategies among countries will be
substantial.
Yet in spite of the similarity of initial starting points and underly-
ing pressures for change, the trajectory of the telecommunications
industry in the United States and Germany has diverged.  We argue that
the different paths of restructuring in the two countries reflect classic
underlying differences in governance structures and industrial relations
systems.  There is also variation within the United States, however,
which reflects the weak institutionalization and fragmentation in gov-
ernment regulatory bodies and labor market institutions at the national
and state levels.  Thus, we argue that differences in national and
regional industrial relations systems play a central role, both in shaping
regulatory policy and in shaping corporate strategy and work organiza-
tion.  These alternative approaches, in turn, lead to significantly differ-
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ent outcomes for stakeholders: consumers, firms, employees, and
unions.  We distinguish cases along a continuum from the highly
unconstrained, “market-driven” example of AT&T, to the intermediate
“consumer-driven” cases of two RBOCs, to the highly constrained,
“labor-mediated” approach of Germany.
On the product market side, deregulation and reregulation are the
result of political contests within existing institutional structures and
are therefore not exogenous.  In the AT&T case, market reform was
evolutionary and did not occur through legislative or “overtly political”
action.  Rather, MCI, backed by corporate constituents, used the FCC
and the courts to create a “free market.”  In an interesting twist on the
historic use of the courts to undermine labor’s power, the MCI coali-
tion used the courts to undermine the power of the unionized employer
and create a nonunion alternative.  The resulting policy was one of
“regulatory asymmetry” that privileged new entrants, ensured that
AT&T would lose market share, and prohibited former Bell system
companies from entering certain product markets (local and cable TV
in the case of AT&T and long distance, equipment, and cable TV in the
case of the RBOCs).  This structure, in turn, created the incentive for
reregulated Bell companies to shift the costs of restructuring to their
unionized workforce.  In sum, the evolutionary transformation of the
product market was a response to corporate constituents who pushed in
a pluralistic (or fragmented) institutional environment not for complete
market deregulation but for reregulation that would favor new entrants.
In contrast to AT&T, the RBOCs enjoyed a longer time horizon
and more favorable conditions for restructuring because they served
local markets, which were not as lucrative for new entrants.  More
importantly, politically elected regulators and legislators were con-
cerned about the potential negative effects of restructuring on the mass
of citizen consumers—their political base. The RBOCs were and con-
tinue to be regulated by state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs),
elected bodies whose purpose is to keep rates low for consumers and to
ensure universal service.  Product-market liberalization occurred incre-
mentally, on a state-by-state basis.  In exchange for guarantees of low
rates and continued quality service, some state PUCs replaced fixed
rates with more market-oriented, “incentive” rates—rates that allowed
RBOCs to retain some of the profits from efficiency-enhancing innova-
tions.  In the two cases here, BellSouth was successful in this strategy
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in all of its nine states, while NYNEX3 was not.  In addition, rather
than oppose deregulation as AT&T had done, all of the RBOCs united
to use their political strength in states and communities across the
country to gain U.S. Congressional support for a version of deregula-
tion that favored incumbent local providers, the bill that finally passed
in 1996.
In the German case, it was the powerful Deutsche Postgewerk-
schaft (DPG) union that successfully pressured the national govern-
ment to approach deregulation at a much slower and more cautious
pace and in ways that have privileged and protected Deutsche Telekom
in the intervening period.  In this case, the “regulatory asymmetry,”
which favors Telekom and the unionized workforce, is not a response
to business (as in the AT&T case) or to consumers (as in the RBOC
case), but to labor.  As Germany privatizes and deregulates the tele-
communications industry, for example, Telekom has been allowed to
continue monopoly control of the cable TV market, potentially giving
it a substantial strategic and competitive advantage.  The DPG was able
to exercise significant influence and protect employee and union inter-
ests because it operated in a neocorporatist framework within a “semi-
sovereign state” (Katzenstein 1987).  That is, within the German sys-
tem, political power is dispersed between large, encompassing social
groups and decentralized states.  The integration of peak economic
interests into the formulation of economic policy constrains unilateral
decision making and promotes cooperation and consensus.  Privatiza-
tion and reregulation have, consequently, occurred in a framework
designed to perpetuate union and employee rights.
Differences in labor market institutions and managerial strategic
choice provide a parallel story.  AT&T’s market-driven approach has
been characterized by unilateral action on the part of management, a
failure to jointly develop work reorganization strategies, and a reliance
on technology and reengineering, rather than human resource strate-
gies, to achieve organizational reform and competitiveness.  As a
result, the workforce has borne the major costs of restructuring.  The
restrictions on entering new markets, coupled with the economies of
scale of new technology and cost pressures from new nonunion
entrants, led AT&T to downsize its nonmanagement workforce by 60
percent and the management workforce by 30 percent in a decade. 
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The RBOCs have imitated many of AT&T’s strategies, but with a
longer time horizon and under the constraints of state PUCs.  While the
mission of the PUCs is not to protect union or workers’ rights, unions
have been able to leverage the concern of the PUCs for consumer wel-
fare to gain decisions that also benefit workers.  For example, unions
have united with consumer groups to block rate reform unless accom-
panied by higher staffing levels to ensure good customer service.  They
also have induced the RBOCs to agree to union rights in their new sub-
sidiaries in exchange for not opposing RBOC petitions before state
utility commissions.  Thus, the strategic use of PUC oversight by
unions has had an indirect positive effect on worker welfare and union
rights, an effect that varies among states.
The German approach, by contrast, has been a “mutualist,” or
labor-mediated, one.  The DPG has slowed the pace of deregulation
while simultaneously seeking to protect union and employee interests
through detailed involvement and participation in the reorganization of
work and corporate structures.  Equally, until late 1995, the DPG
restricted the possibility of downsizing, while it also influenced corpo-
rate strategies to encourage the development of an expanded range of
services to ease the impact of digitalization on the workforce.  How-
ever, the slower pace has translated into slower adoption of new tech-
nologies, work practices, and corporate structures.  The quality and
availability of new services has suffered.  Consequently, consumers
rather than workers have absorbed more of the costs of restructuring.
The remainder of this chapter elaborates the details of the above argu-
ment by presenting the evidence of the U.S. cases and the German
case.  Comparative analysis and conclusions for mutual learning fol-
low.
THE UNITED STATES
The events surrounding the breakup of the Bell System in 1984
have been well documented (Coll 1986; Temin 1987; Stone 1989;
Teske 1990; Cohen 1992).  The attack on AT&T’s monopoly was in
response to a series of regulatory decisions, in the 1940s through
1960s, which meant that AT&T’s high long-distance rates were
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increasingly subsidizing local calls.  This created an incentive for new
competitors to enter the lucrative long-distance market, offering ser-
vices at costs lower than AT&T but above “market-clearing” prices.
After winning a 1969 lawsuit that allowed it to provide private-line ser-
vices, MCI spent the next decade building an anti-AT&T coalition
comprising other new entrants, the computer industry led by IBM, and
major corporate users, particularly multinational financial services and
airline corporations (Aronson and Cowhey 1988; Teske 1990; Cohen
1992).  A series of FCC decisions in the 1970s, coupled with court rul-
ings which favored the anti-AT&T coalition, progressively undermined
the structure of the Bell system.
Divestiture occurred with very little political support.  Over 70 per-
cent of telephone customers opposed the 1984 breakup of the Bell sys-
tem (Keefe and Boroff 1994, p. 316), as did state PUCs and
independent telephone companies.4  Even the Reagan administration
opposed the breakup.  However, the pluralistic structure of the U.S.
government meant that “interested parties could approach that part of
the government most sympathetic to their cause” (Temin 1987, p. 341).
In the early 1980s, MCI, IBM, and business customers achieved their
goals through the Department of Justice and the courts, having become
frustrated with Congress and temporarily blocked by the FCC.
The court order that dismantled the Bell system in 1984 responded
to the interests of the anti-AT&T coalition: MCI and other alternative
providers gained access to long-distance markets; multinational corpo-
rate users obtained reductions in the cost of long distance and equip-
ment inputs.  AT&T retained its long-distance and equipment operation
but was forced to compete in a system of “asymmetric regulation,”
which ensured that AT&T’s long-distance market share dropped
steadily.  By 1994, this share amounted to 60 percent (FCC 1992/
1993).  AT&T’s 22 local telephone companies were merged into the
seven RBOC monopolies, which were barred from participation in
equipment production.  They could only enter other markets providing
they did not use their monopoly position to do so. 
Stakeholders, such as unions, employees, and residential custom-
ers, were entirely excluded from the deregulatory process and were
unable to promote either the status quo or the security of union institu-
tions, a sharp contrast to Germany.  In spite of the fact that Bell system
employees numbered over one million, or almost 1 percent of the U.S.
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workforce, neither job security nor the future of collective bargaining
structures was addressed in the divestiture process (Darbishire 1997b).
In the following sections, we assess the variation in processes and
outcomes of restructuring in the cases of AT&T and of the RBOCs
BellSouth and NYNEX, to illustrate how variation in product and labor
market institutions have shaped firm strategies and stakeholder out-
comes.  The variation reflects differences in the extent and rapidity of
deregulation, differences between local and long-distance product mar-
kets, and differences in the political embeddedness of the enterprises
and union strategic responses.  More fundamentally, the extent of vari-
ation reflects the fact that institutions such as labor unions and
employee and consumer groups that might have strengthened the posi-
tions of their members were weak, and this weakness left room for sub-
stantial managerial prerogative in shaping reregulation.  
AT&T
The AT&T case represents a strong example of managerial prerog-
ative in which the company focused on converting itself from a public
service bureaucracy to a lean, sales-maximizing global enterprise.
Three factors shaped AT&T’s business and labor strategy during this
period: its strategic focus on global over domestic markets, its lack of
political constraints or local service requirements, and its need to
immediately compete in an asymmetrical regulatory environment
against new low-cost competitors such as MCI and Sprint.  Union
influence on AT&T’s strategy has been limited to maintaining high rel-
ative wages and negotiating generous severance and early retirement
packages in exchange for labor peace.  Although joint labor–manage-
ment work-design initiatives received considerable publicity in the
1990s, they had little impact on actual management practices. 
First, with respect to globalization, AT&T focused on the “natural”
extension of its long-distance market and leveraged this competitive
advantage to create international networks, reshaping itself into a glo-
bal corporation.  Global service means providing an integrated set of
voice, data, and video services though a seamless international net-
work, particularly for multinational businesses.  This global strategy
has included political efforts to reduce international trade barriers,
including a strong push to deregulate public monopolies in all coun-
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tries.  The RBOCs, by contrast, have entered international markets by
leveraging their expertise in local service provision to form joint ven-
tures with national monopolists to improve basic services, particularly
in developing countries.
Second, AT&T and the RBOC’s historic division of the long-dis-
tance and local market within the United States means that AT&T
largely has indirect contact with its massive customer base.  AT&T’s
long-distance service is provided through access to local networks
operated by the RBOCs, who themselves have a more direct and ongo-
ing relationship with customers.  AT&T continues to be regulated by
the FCC, but it does not have political ties to states or regions and is not
constrained by state PUCs.  AT&T has taken advantage of its national
structure to consolidate and move operations to whatever location
offers the lowest cost. The RBOCs, by contrast, cannot move opera-
tions out of their state jurisdictions without state PUC approval.   
Finally, in 1984 (just after the deregulation of the long-distance
and equipment markets), AT&T immediately began competing against
new nonunion, low-cost entrants in long distance in the asymmetric
regulatory environment.  The cost advantages of these new competitors
derived from the following: they did not inherit bureaucratic organiza-
tional structures, they began with more maintenance-free technologies,
they did not have sunk costs in obsolete technologies or have to reengi-
neer complex systems, and they were operating with a younger, non-
union workforce with labor costs of roughly half those of the Bell
companies.
To respond to these cost pressures, AT&T reorganized into cross-
functional business units targeting distinct market segments: large busi-
ness, small business, and residential customers.  To achieve segmented
marketing strategies, business unit reorganization, and geographic con-
solidation, AT&T relied primarily on its traditional strengths of tech-
nology and engineering to achieve economies of scale rather than on
human resource strategies.  It anticipated significant gains in cross-
functional coordination through reengineered information systems that
flow horizontally.  These technology and reengineering strategies were
designed to maximize the multiple goals of reducing costs, increasing
the speed and quality of transmission, expanding the variety of services
offered, and improving response time.
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On the network side, AT&T upgraded its long-distance network by
replacing copper with fiber-optic cable and completing the digitaliza-
tion of switching and transmission systems.  Together these technolo-
gies created a system that is largely maintenance-free and has greater
capacity to transmit voice, video, data, and higher quality service.  Dig-
italization allows employees to remotely diagnose and repair network
systems.  This capability has reduced the demand for blue-collar craft
workers with high levels of traditional electromechanical skills.  They
have been replaced by a much smaller number of white-collar com-
puter specialists and systems analysts and a much larger number of
computer-monitoring clerks paid at 80 percent of former craft wages.
Central office switching was consolidated into two major centers—one
serving customers east of the Mississippi and one serving those to the
west, plus a handful of remote regional centers (MacDuffie and Mac-
coby 1986).
On the sales and service side, AT&T cut costs and labor by consol-
idating hundreds of local operator and customer service offices into a
handful of remote national centers with toll-free phone access.  Rather
than reduce Taylorism,5 it has used new computer and software infor-
mation systems to create repetitive jobs that are machine-paced, elec-
tronically monitored, and functionally specialized.  This strategy,
however, varies significantly by market segment.  Automatic call distri-
bution systems determine the call volume of customers and automati-
cally link them to the appropriate labor market segment. College-
educated managers handle large business customers and provide on-
site, “one-stop shopping.”  Nonmanagement service consultants serve
small business customers, handling 25–30 calls per day.  Residential
service reps serve the mass of consumers; unlike “universal service
reps” of the past, these employees are now functionally specialized into
sales, billing, collections, and repair.  Furthermore, they are tied to
computers driven by expert systems and handle roughly 80–90 calls
per day.  Management and union representatives alike agree that these
have become the most stressful jobs in the industry because of intense
pressure to sell, to handle customers courteously, and to turn over calls
quickly, all within the context of ongoing electronic monitoring. 
In sum, the market segmentation strategy increases inequality in
service among customer segments according to the ability to pay; the
strategy also increases labor market segmentation within companies, as
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the design of jobs, skill requirements, and wage levels are equated to
the customer segment being served (see Batt 2000a for a broader dis-
cussion of these segmentation strategies and outcomes).  This segmen-
tation strategy, coupled with the downward pressure on wages from
nonunion competitors, particularly at the lower end, has led to
increased labor market inequality within occupations, companies, and
the industry as a whole.  Between 1984 and 1994, for example, wage
inequality within customer services more than tripled (Batt and
Strausser 1998; Batt and Keefe 1999).
Two additional effects of these strategies on the workforce have
been paramount: labor displacement and declining morale.  While ini-
tially viewed as a temporary strategy, downsizing became an increas-
ingly routine part of business for AT&T in the decade following
deregulation.  AT&T reduced its domestic nonmanagement workforce
by 60 percent between 1984 and 1995 (from 250,000 to 100,000); it
reduced management ranks by 33 percent.6  As downsizing continued,
involuntary rather than voluntary separations came to represent an
increasing proportion of the terminations, with later rounds of down-
sizing offering employees smaller severance or early retirement pack-
ages.  In the first two years of postdivestiture operations, for example,
AT&T reduced its head count by 56,000 positions.  Only 25 percent
involved layoffs; the remainder left through attrition, voluntary sever-
ance, early retirement, transfers within AT&T, or transfers back to the
RBOCs.  Between 1984 and 1992, 58 percent of separations in the
unionized workforce involved layoffs, while 42 percent involved vol-
untary separations.  In the company’s 1996 announcement of another
round of downsizing, it indicated that most separations would occur
through layoffs (see Keefe and Batt 1997).
For the survivor workforce, restructuring has had profound effects
on morale.  While in 1981, 68 percent of the nonmanagement employ-
ees felt that the company provided job security and only 8 percent did
not, by 1991, the opposite was true: 73 percent said there was little job
security while less than 4 percent felt there was any job security.  Sixty-
six percent felt unable to affect the course of events at AT&T, and 80
percent had little confidence in management’s ability to lead the corpo-
ration (Keefe and Batt 1997).  Career opportunities also fell.  Whereas
in the past, employees would follow job ladders in local communities,
now they often had to move their families across the country to accept
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promotion opportunities.  A 1991 study surveyed workers who had sur-
vived several rounds of downsizing at AT&T.  Those workers whose
jobs had been “surplused” (eliminated) and who had stayed at AT&T
by transferring to other positions found themselves in the “surplus” sta-
tus on average 2.5 times in a five-year period (Keefe and Boroff 1994,
p. 328).  Some 87 percent of the survey respondents said they wanted
to keep their current jobs until they retired, but less than 10 percent
believed that there was any opportunity for advancement at AT&T
(Keefe and Boroff 1994, p. 328).
AT&T’s cost-cutting labor strategy also included shifting from a
predominantly unionized (67 percent) workforce in 1984 to a predomi-
nantly nonunionized one (42 percent) in 1995.  This was accomplished
by downsizing the unionized core, expanding the workforce in non-
union enterprises, and increasing the number of management job titles,
which are ineligible for union representation.  AT&T established two
nonunion subsidiaries, American Transtech (the largest U.S. telemar-
keting service) and AT&T Universal Card (the second largest U.S.
credit card company).  It acquired two nonunion equipment manufac-
turers, Paradyne (data communications equipment) and National Cash
Register (NCR).  American Transtech and NCR were subsequently
spun off as separate companies.  In addition, new jobs requiring more
technical or professional skills related to new technologies were often
defined as managerial and exempt from union representation.  As a
result, the percentage of the workforce defined as managerial grew
from 29 percent in 1984 to over 50 percent in 1995 (Keefe and Batt
1997).
Labor–management relations, historically cooperative, collapsed
under these pressures, as did the Quality of Worklife (QWL) program
negotiated in 1980.  Beginning in the late 1980s, AT&T initiated some
joint union–management experiments in total quality management
(TQM) and self-managed teams.  However, most fell apart in the 1990s
when the company initiated downsizing and reengineering, which
undermined employee morale and the stable relationships between
workers and managers necessary to make these innovations successful.
In 1992, a negotiated pact, “Workplace of the Future,” was designed to
reestablish cooperative labor–management relations by involving the
union and workers in work innovations at several levels of the organi-
zation, from the strategic business units to the workplace.  Successful
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adoption, however, depended on managerial choice at decentralized
business units, and few managers chose to participate.  Today, many
managers, workers, and trade unionists remain highly skeptical about
top management’s commitment to this effort.  They cite AT&T’s his-
tory of presenting positive public relations images but not following
through on the implementation.
The Regional Bell Companies: 
BellSouth and NYNEX 
The political debate and approach to regulatory reform surround-
ing the RBOCs has been considerably different than that for AT&T
because of the RBOCs’ central role in providing basic universal ser-
vice.  The issue of consumer welfare figured more prominently in the
debate over deregulating local markets among both national and state
officials, and as elected officials responded to their constituents, labor
often benefited as an unintended consequence.  While long-distance
service is viewed as unessential, local service is considered a necessity
for emergency medical and life-threatening circumstances.  Because
costs exceed revenues in local service, regulators historically ensured
universal service by requiring AT&T to help subsidize local service by
paying an access fee to connect to the local Bell infrastructure, a
requirement extended to all long-distance companies after 1984.  
The central problem in local service deregulation, therefore, was to
figure out how to ensure continued universal access, particularly in
small towns and rural areas.  A “free market” solution would have
resulted in dramatic price increases for basic service, an unacceptable
political solution.  This, in fact, did occur as a result of long-distance
deregulation, where long-distance rates dropped by 40 percent and call
volume doubled, but basic residential rates increased by more than 60
percent—from $11.58 to $18.66 (Keefe and Boroff 1994, p. 318).7
The RBOCs, therefore, continued their monopoly in local service
in the decade after divestiture while regulators considered alternative
solutions.  This longer time horizon also benefited consumers as well
as employees by allowing the RBOCs to reduce their workforce
through attrition, early retirement offerings, or through retraining and
replacement in growth sides of the business, particularly cellular.
Finally in 1996, a politically powerful RBOC coalition successfully
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pushed through its version of legislative reform in the U.S. Congress, a
“fast track” version that favored incumbent providers over AT&T,
MCI, and new entrants.  In this version, local companies could offer
long-distance service as soon as they opened their markets to competi-
tors; but because of their established base, the RBOCs were considered
to have a competitive advantage.  Moreover, in May 1997, FCC regula-
tors finally issued rules to handle the cross-subsidy problem.  While a
comprehensive agreement on universal service was not reached, an ini-
tial compromise gave the RBOCs transition time by phasing in reduc-
tions in access charges over a five-year period, a longer time horizon
that will ease the negative effects on labor adjustment.  The long-dis-
tance lobby (AT&T, MCI, Sprint, and others) had sought complete,
immediate reductions.  FCC regulators also protected low-end users,
raised monthly rates by $1.50 for second lines to residences (e.g.,
higher-end consumers) and $3.00 for business consumers, and created
a special fund to subsidize Internet access to schools and public librar-
ies (Landler 1997).
Meanwhile, at the state level, the ongoing oversight of PUCs con-
strained the RBOCs’ business strategies in ways that directly favored
consumers, and indirectly, labor.  In the first half of the 1990s, for
example, PUCs cited several RBOCs for poor service delivery (Bell
Atlantic, NYNEX, and U.S. West), and in some cases (e.g., Bell Atlan-
tic and U.S. West) required the companies to increase staffing levels to
meet consumer demands.
State PUCs differ considerably in their standards and policies, and
BellSouth and NYNEX represent opposite ends of the spectrum.
While NYNEX has historically faced a “tough” New York state utility
commission (with respect to rate setting and service standards), Bell-
South has faced a more lenient one in its several-state area.  BellSouth
and NYNEX also operate under distinct labor laws; BellSouth operates
almost entirely in “right-to-work” states, with laws that weaken union
institutional security.  Thus, differences in the political role of the regu-
lators and in labor laws create a distinct institutional framework at the
regional level.  However, institutional variation does not fully explain
the regional variation in restructuring processes and outcomes.  In light
of weak regional institutional structures for stakeholder participation,
the strategic choices of the companies and their unions played a far
stronger role in determining the variation of outcomes (Turner 1991). 
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On the one hand, the BellSouth strategy emphasized joint partner-
ships to improve customer service, relatively high levels of employ-
ment stability (force reductions of roughly 20 percent), but low relative
wage and benefit increases.  The Communication Workers of America
(CWA, of which District 3 represents workers in the BellSouth region)
emphasized labor–management cooperation as the most effective way
to build union membership and power in the context of weak labor
laws.  Yet even here, it was difficult to sustain a cooperative approach
to implementing work reorganization in the face of anticipated local
deregulation.  On the other hand, the NYNEX strategy included no
union involvement in workplace innovations, high wage and benefit
increases, and high levels of workforce reductions (roughly 35–40 per-
cent).  The regional union at NYNEX (District 1 of the CWA) had the
most militant record of the seven regional districts and pursued the
most aggressively adversarial strategy against NYNEX in its six north-
eastern states.  In response, the company sued for labor peace begin-
ning in 1992, a shift in strategy that led to high employment security
for the survivor workforce through the most extensive retraining and
replacement program in the industry. 
BellSouth
Even though BellSouth operates in a relatively weak regulatory
environment in right-to-work states, union membership traditionally
has been high (over 80 percent of union-eligible employees), and the
union and management had adopted a cooperative relationship.  This
cooperative approach dates to a particularly bitter strike in 1956, after
which the company accepted the union as a fact of life and began build-
ing a relationship of trust and mutual respect.  The union also made the
strategic decision to pursue cooperation to keep membership levels
high in this right-to-work environment, where workers could choose
whether or not to be members and feared management retaliation.
Regular interactions between union leadership and management fol-
lowed the negotiation of a “responsible relationship clause” between
AT&T and the CWA in 1966, while by 1971, a problem-solving
approach to grievances had reduced the number reaching the state
executive level by 50 percent.  In 1977 negotiations, the parties agreed
to a procedure to expedite arbitrations (Crane 1990).
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Experiments in “participatory management” began in the late
1970s (Crane 1990, pp. 34–46), and when AT&T and the national
CWA negotiated the joint QWL program in 1980, Southern Bell and
CWA District 3 actively implemented it at local worksites.  While
QWL efforts soon died out in most companies, at BellSouth they still
numbered over 600 in 1989 when they were merged into a TQM pro-
gram.  Workers generally viewed QWL programs as a benefit, an
example of management actually listening to their concerns.  Addition-
ally, the parties at BellSouth developed a joint QWL oversight structure
in which management at the district (local), state, and corporate levels
invited union leaders to attend regularly scheduled business meetings,
an important precedent for subsequent labor–management information
sharing and consultation.
In the early 1990s, the parties formalized union participation in
monthly business meetings and set up a three-tiered joint structure for
union–management collaboration in TQM.  The union backed the strat-
egy to improve competitiveness and save jobs.  Joint labor–manage-
ment training teams at the local, state, and corporate levels developed
curriculum and provided training to virtually all employees in the com-
pany over a two-year period.  The trainers also provided technical
assistance in problem solving, process improvement, and job redesign
efforts such as self-managed teams.  The parties also negotiated the
parameters for local experimentation in workplace innovations, includ-
ing telecommuting, self-managed teams, and bringing subcontracted
work back in-house.
Local experimentation with TQM and self-managed teams was
substantial, and by 1994 both management and the union considered
the efforts successful.  Twenty percent of workers in network and cus-
tomer services had participated in TQM problem-solving teams, and 5
percent were participating in self-managed teams.  Quantitative evalua-
tion comparing performance of self-managed and traditionally super-
vised work groups showed significant positive effects of teams for the
company, workers, and the union: performance of teams was signifi-
cantly higher, indirect labor costs fell, workers preferred the arrange-
ments, and nonmanagement jobs were saved at the expense of
management jobs (Batt 1999, 2001).  A 1996 customer service survey
by an independent consulting firm found that BellSouth had the top rat-
ings in customer service of any telephone company (J.D. Power and
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Associates 1996).  Furthermore, a 1994 survey found that 92 percent of
managers and 81 percent of local union presidents supported the
union’s participation in TQM.  Seventy-seven percent of managers and
77 percent of union presidents believed that union participation was
critical to the success of TQM.  Ninety-seven percent of local union
presidents were participating in monthly business meetings, and 32
percent were participating in weekly management staff meetings.  Sim-
ilarly, 90 percent of workers believed the union should participate in
TQM, and 60 percent believed union participation was critical to the
program’s success (Batt 2000b).  The union also supported the com-
pany in going before state PUCs to gain regulatory reforms that would
shift rate regulation from fixed to incentive-based systems, a shift that
allowed the company to keep some of its profits from efficiency gains.
The union’s participation in partnership strategies depended funda-
mentally on the company’s long-standing commitment to employment
and union institutional security and to the mature bargaining relation-
ship that the company and union had achieved.  At the time of divesti-
ture, for example, when BellSouth set up a separate subsidiary known
as Advanced Systems, Inc. (ASI), it negotiated a separate contract with
the CWA rather than operate ASI as a nonunion subsidiary (in contrast
to AT&T).  In the first round of bargaining after divestiture, BellSouth
was the only RBOC to agree to the union’s request for regionwide bar-
gaining (as opposed to the more decentralized approach of bargaining
with each telephone company in the region).  All postdivestiture con-
tracts were approved by the membership without strikes.  The company
and union also used memoranda of agreement extensively between
contracts to promote workplace change.  Other negotiated clauses off-
set the membership declines associated with attrition.  A 1989 joint
union–management task force studied the content of managerial jobs
and returned 550 jobs to the bargaining unit.  A 1995 joint study team
studied the costs of subcontracting work out and negotiated an agree-
ment to bring the work in-house.
Compared with AT&T and NYNEX, BellSouth has pursued a high
relative employment strategy with low relative wages.  This strategy
may reflect the market characteristics of the region, where (at the time)
the population was more rural, geographically dispersed, and growing.
Employment fell through attrition by roughly 10,000, or 12 percent of
83,000 employees between 1990 and 1993.  Another 10,800 employees
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were targeted to leave between 1994 and 1996, with roughly equal per-
centages of managers and workers affected, but many of these proved
unnecessary as market conditions improved.  Wage increases were rel-
atively low (averaging about 2–3 percent annually after divestiture).  
Cooperative labor relations were critical to the considerable exper-
imentation in work innovations at BellSouth.  Yet this cooperation was
based on the strategic choices of management and labor, rather than
through local mandates that would have institutionalized stakeholder
participation; and, this cooperative work reorganization occurred in a
context in which unilateral management rights threatened to reassert
themselves.  In fact, by the mid 1990s, BellSouth was adopting a strat-
egy of reengineering, reducing the emphasis on self-managed teams (in
spite of their success), and increasing its emphasis on downsizing.
This strategic withdrawal from cooperation strained union–manage-
ment relations, and in 1995 bargaining, the union and management
reduced their commitment to joint activities.  Management’s unilateral
decision to focus on reengineering and consolidation of work sites
illustrated the weak position of the union in sustaining a cooperative
approach in the absence of legal mandates. 
NYNEX
In contrast to CWA District 3 at BellSouth, the official position of
the regional leadership of both the International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers (IBEW) and the CWA District 1, which represent
NYNEX workers, was one of nonparticipation in joint quality and per-
formance-improvement teams.  Both unions had a militant history and
both continued a traditional approach of “effects bargaining” through-
out the 1990s.8   That is, management makes technology and opera-
tional decisions, and the union negotiates the effects of those decisions.
Both unions collaborated effectively in a successful three-month strike
in 1989 over maintaining health care benefits; they formed a consumer
coalition and successfully convinced the New York PUC to refuse the
company’s request for a rate increase during the strike, a decision that
was a major factor in the NYNEX’s decision to settle the strike.9  The
unions’ militant strategy over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s
resulted in the highest wage and benefit increases in the industry.
NYNEX negotiated 3–4 percent annual wage increases in all four
rounds of bargaining since divestiture in 1984 (almost double those at
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BellSouth); it is the only company to continue to provide fully paid
health insurance without the requirement of shifting to health mainte-
nance organizations or copayments.
As a result of the 1989 strike, the company made the strategic deci-
sion to bring in a seasoned labor relations expert from AT&T (James
Dowdall), whose sole purpose was to develop a mature bargaining rela-
tionship with the two unions.  For 1992 bargaining, Dowdall hosted the
unions in a two-week joint training session in mutual gains techniques
and paved the way for labor peace.  In 1992 bargaining, the company
and unions established formal joint committees around technology and
workplace issues, but by management and union accounts alike, these
existed on paper only.  The bitterness evoked during the 1989 strike
continued for several years, undermining any real possibility for joint
labor–management efforts.  Because both unions give considerable
autonomy to locals, local union leaders have the choice of participating
in joint committees.  Only a handful did so, however; the overwhelm-
ing majority of local leaders consistently followed district policy,
refusing to participate in joint productivity-enhancing programs such
as the kind overwhelmingly supported by union leaders at BellSouth.
Meanwhile, work restructuring followed a path emphasizing reengi-
neering, the creation of customer service “megacenters,” and labor dis-
placement to obtain cost savings.  
In spite of their traditionally adversarial bargaining relationship, in
1994 the parties negotiated the most far-reaching employment and
union security clauses in the industry.  The NYNEX strategy was to
build a highly educated, flexible, and productive technical workforce
but without employee or union participation in work redesign.  In
addition to wage increases above the industry average, NYNEX
agreed to heavy investment in a two-year training program that created
a new multiskilled craft title of “Telecommunications Technical Asso-
ciate,” or “Super-Tech.”  In the first two years of the program, roughly
1,100 employees enrolled (Clifton 2000).  The new contract also
developed a force reduction plan with incentives aimed at voluntarily
eliminating 16,800 of 57,000 nonmanagement jobs at an estimated
cost of over $2 billion, or $77,000 per participating employee (many
of these proved unnecessary because market demand increased dra-
matically).  In addition, the contract enabled all NYNEX employees
with five years of service to take a two-year educational leave; created
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a job bank and a new job-sharing provision; guaranteed union workers
access to all new NYNEX ventures; ensured that new subsidiaries
were required to offer union workers the opportunity to bid into the
new jobs; and further enhanced union institutional security through
card-check recognition, company neutrality, and access to NYNEX’s
nonunion workplaces.  These provisions helped the CWA win a
closely contested union election victory among 1,500 customer service
representatives in New England, a unit that had historically been anti-
union and had turned down representation in previous campaigns.
In sum, in exchange for high wages, retraining, union security, and
expansion into nonunion subsidiaries, the unions agreed to more sub-
stantial employment reductions than were taking place at other
regional companies, although in the end, these reductions were fewer
than expected and occurred through attrition and early retirement buy-
outs.  By 1993, NYNEX had eliminated 19,000 jobs, but only 6,000
were among union members, who accepted generous early retirement
offers.  The remaining 13,000 were among managers, who either
accepted generous settlements or forced layoffs.  Under the 1994 con-
tract, the 16,800 nonmanagement jobs targeted for elimination by 1996
would have amounted to an overall drop of at least 35 percent.  The
company strategy was to build a (smaller) highly skilled, flexible, and
productive workforce while maintaining unilateral management rights
with respect to operational decision making.
The unions were able to make gains in employment and union
institutional security in part because they were able to leverage their
power with the state public utility commission.  That power was critical
to their winning the 1989 strike, which led management to sue for
labor peace in the early 1990s.  In the 1994 negotiations, management
agreed to give the union access to new lines of business in exchange for
the union’s agreement to support it before the state utility commission.
That support was crucial for the company in persuading regulators to
allow it to merge with other companies (Bell Atlantic and GTE).
Despite these more amicable labor relations, the union and company
never experimented with joint workplace innovations.  In fact, labor
relations deteriorated in the second half of the 1990s as the company
experienced unanticipated negative consequences as a result of its
downsizing and cost-cutting focus.  The demand for data and Internet
services and second lines to homes led to an explosion of demand in
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the latter half of the 1990s.  The company substantially underestimated
demand growth and overestimated the number of reductions that it
needed.  In the end, many more employees took the retirement buyouts
than the company would have preferred.  This change of events created
a large understaffing problem, and customer service suffered.  The
company responded by freezing mobility opportunities for frontline
workers and by requiring forced overtime, even for the largely female
office workforce that had never had this requirement.  These and other
conflicts led to a major strike during the 1998 contract negotiations.
Thus, the company and unions continue to have very traditional union
and management roles, with management retaining decision-making
authority and the union engaged in effects bargaining.  In contrast to
the AT&T case, however, the unions continue to be able to go before
state regulators on issues such as adequate staffing for customer service
and employment security, to prevent jobs from being outsourced to
other states. 
GERMANY
The labor-mediated path to a deregulated telecommunications mar-
ket in Germany has differed substantially from the judicial drive to a
free market in the AT&T case as well as the consumer-driven path in
the case of the RBOCs.  Neocorporatist decision-making structures
have resulted in the use of legislation to promote the social market,
have created asymmetric structures of regulation which have benefited
Deutsche Telekom, and have minimized the negative effects of restruc-
turing on union and employee stakeholders.  Consistent with the pro-
motion of the social market, stakeholders (including the firm,
employees, unions, suppliers, and to some extent residential consum-
ers) have been full participants in restructuring at both the industry and
firm level, influencing the speed, form, and structure of the reregulated
product market, and developing new work practices, labor adjustment,
and corporate structures.  However, once European Union (EU) poli-
cies began to drive deregulation, they helped undermine the influence
of stakeholders and actually altered the nature of Germany’s semisov-
ereign state (Darbishire 1997b, 2000; Katzenstein 1987).
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In perpetuating the social market, the participation of multiple
stakeholders in a quasi-corporatist policymaking process has resulted
in a path of restructuring that exhibits high levels of stability, limited
deregulation, and limited labor displacement.  In contrast to the United
States, a strategy of technological displacement of labor and cost mini-
mization has not dominated.  Of equal importance, however, the per-
formance of Telekom has continued to lag behind that of AT&T and the
RBOCs along several dimensions: slower restructuring to take advan-
tage of new technology, difficulty in reorienting Telekom from provid-
ing a basic social infrastructure to being a critical input into business
competitiveness, and fewer experiments or innovations in work organi-
zation.  The costs of restructuring also have been distributed signifi-
cantly differently among the stakeholders, with customers receiving
poorer service and higher costs.
In spite of being highly competent technologically and having the
largest cable TV and integrated services digital network (ISDN) in the
world, Deutsche Telekom has been slow to utilize the potential of new
technology.  By 1994, for example, only 30 percent of network switch-
ing and transmission was digital, compared with 100 percent in the
United States and Britain.  The availability of services from Telekom
has also been poor, and problems include underdevelopment of data
transmission, absence of itemized billing, high prices, long waiting
lists for installation and repair, and high fault rates (DTI 1994).  The
lack of integrated computer systems to provide enhanced customer ser-
vice has compounded these problems, while organizational and net-
work structures and operating procedures have been slow to adjust and
realize performance gains, even where new technology has been intro-
duced.  Furthermore, slow digitalization of the network and poor per-
formance occurred in spite of Telekom investing substantially more
than other telecommunications companies in the 1980s (Gerpott and
Pospischil 1993; Darbishire 1997a).
In parallel with the United States, the telecommunications market
in Germany historically was organized as a closely regulated monop-
oly.  However, it also operated under public ownership and, until 1989,
as part of the Deutsche Bundespost jointly with the postal and tele-
graph services.  As part of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions, regulatory and operational decision making were not separated,
and Telekom was immediately subordinate to the federal minister.
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With an underlying mandate of public service comparable to that of
AT&T prior to divestiture, Telekom focused on its public service obli-
gations and underplayed commercial objectives.  Similarly, Telekom’s
universal focus meant that it was slow to respond to the capabilities of
new technologies and use them to develop differentiated market seg-
ments or meet the divergent demands of business and residential cus-
tomers.
Repeated attempts to reform the Deutsche Bundespost in the 1960s
and 1970s included proposals to create a management structure with
greater independence from political influence and to operate Telekom
on business principles.  Although reform proposals clearly accepted the
principle that public ownership, monopoly provision, universal service,
and social welfare obligations should be retained, these attempts failed,
largely because of union opposition (Duch 1991; Noam 1992).
In 1982 the Bundespost as a whole was responsible for 3.4 percent
of the German gross national product (GNP), contributed 10 percent of
its revenues to the government, employed 500,000 workers, and was by
far the most important purchaser of equipment from Siemens, one of
the world’s largest telecommunications equipment manufacturers
(Noam 1992).  However, this is insufficient to explain Deutsche Tele-
kom’s slow process of deregulation, because AT&T was in a similar
position as the world’s largest company, with over one million employ-
ees.  Rather, in contrast to the United States, German unions succeeded
in watering down policy initiatives during the 1980s.  German institu-
tional structures grant social partners, such as the unions, a substan-
tially greater institutionalized voice in the management of the
economy, and in the structure and timing of deregulation, than does the
United States.  This neocorporatist role of the social partners, a central
component of what Katzenstein (1987) characterizes as the “semisov-
ereign state,” substantially limits the extent of deregulation.  
The neocorporatist structures allowed the stakeholders (employees,
unions, and their work councils) within the Bundespost to form a pas-
sive coalition against any fundamental shift in the strategic orientation
(or organization) of the telecommunications industry, such as implied
by digitalization.  In contrast to the United States, no dominant reform-
ist business cohort could form in Germany to promote a significant
deregulation of the industry, in large part because of the institutional-
ized position of existing stakeholders.  The stakeholders included not
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only employees, but also suppliers, who long operated an effective car-
tel in the equipment market, with prices substantially above world lev-
els (Darbishire 1997b).
The continued debate over the structure of the Deutsche Bundes-
post and, as importantly, over the inaction that resulted from each
reform attempt, was reflected in the influential 1987 report of the Witte
Commission.  This body was appointed by the government to examine
the future structure of the telecommunications industry.  The Commis-
sion reflected neocorporatism in Germany, as well as the institutional-
ization of stakeholders’ voice, and took one year to establish because
the panel needed to include not only all four major political parties but
also the unions, Bundespost officials, and business (though there were
no representatives of users on the Commission).  The inclusion of a
broad range of stakeholders ensured that a moderate compromise
resulted.
The report recommended separating the entrepreneurial functions
of telecommunications management from regulatory decisions;
increasing managerial independence; separating the three Bundespost
companies (post, bank, and telecommunications); bringing prices
increasingly in line with costs and focusing more on profits; and
increasing the flexibility of the companies in personnel policy (Witte
1987).  After a series of debates over the Witte recommendations, the
government implemented these changes under Post Reform I (July 1,
1989), and also introduced elements of competition into the terminal
equipment, value-added network services, and mobile telecommunica-
tions markets.  The Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (DPG) union consis-
tently opposed these changes, though the ability to block change is less
a feature of corporatism than the ability to significantly influence pol-
icy.  Thus, the compromise nature of Post Reform I ensured that Tele-
kom retained its critical monopoly over telephony services and the
network itself, which constituted 90 percent of its revenue.
The debates surrounding Post Reform I contrasted significantly
with those in the United States over deregulation.  In particular, the
structure of the reregulated product market was not determined by
“secondary” actors (such as the courts) but importantly by those stake-
holders most critically affected by deregulation, including employees,
unions, and the company itself.  The endogeneity of decision making
was characteristic of neocorporatism, a key feature of the German
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model, which applies particularly to corporate bodies such as the
Bundespost, which were founded under public law to carry out impor-
tant policy functions.  The unions were in a position to substantively
affect both the timing and extent of regulatory change.  Indeed, with
respect to telecommunications policy, “all the way up to the Federal
Chancellor there are people who want to avoid a conflict with the DPG
[Deutsche Postgewerkschaft],” given the strength of the union’s influ-
ence (Morgan and Webber 1986, p. 69).  The vigorous opposition of
the DPG to any change in the structure of the Bundespost, or to that of
the telecommunications market, reflected its concerns about the impact
of new technology.  In particular, the DPG was concerned that the new
technology would allow cost cutting through employment reductions.
The union also was concerned that liberalization threatened a signifi-
cant decline in its role, which had long been one of the strongest and
most influential in Germany.
Pressure to further restructure Telekom resurfaced far more rapidly
than had been anticipated after Post Reform I.  The privatization of
Telekom under Post Reform II was enacted in 1994 and driven by three
factors.  First, pressure from the EU played an increasing role in deter-
mining the pace of deregulation.  The European Commission issued a
series of directives under Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome, which suc-
cessfully forced the majority of EU countries, including Germany, to
agree to open their telephony services market by 1998.  Because the
effect of EU policies was to increasingly dictate the regulatory struc-
ture and enforce competition, the very nature of debates within Ger-
many was narrowed.  Consequently, Post Reform II did not even
address deregulation but rather confined itself to privatization.  The
central focus of Post Reform I debates, therefore, was removed from
the arena, and German stakeholders could have little influence on it.
Furthermore, EU directives on procurement policies undermined the
possibility of member states having national champion equipment sup-
pliers, and consequently meant that companies such as Siemens had
progressively less interest in maintaining the status quo.  
Second, and also of considerable importance, German unification
resulted in the need for Telekom to undertake a massive upgrading of
the east German network, with a projected cost of DM 60 billion
between 1990 and 1997.  Given increasing budgetary pressures, the
government proposed the privatization of Telekom under Post Reform
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II to help fund unification.  Because Telekom itself had a deteriorating
financial position, reflected in a declining reserve asset ratio,10 Telekom
management and political parties regarded privatization as a necessary
step to rectify this weakness.  Third, given the growing importance of
the international telecommunications market and an increasing empha-
sis on international joint ventures, Telekom management promoted
privatization to remove restrictions from Telekom’s global ambitions.
Furthermore, the inevitability of product market deregulation led Tele-
kom to argue that it needed to be released from the political control and
bureaucracy of the public sector (Darbishire 1995).  
In addition to generating greater stability in the telecommunica-
tions market in Germany, the integrated role of key stakeholders, par-
ticularly employees and unions, helped them protect their own
interests.  The DPG principally campaigned for employee and union
institutional security.  At the industry level, both the Länder, or federal
states, and the DPG were concerned with how EU policies to liberalize
the product market would be enacted in Germany.  Stakeholders
ensured their influence on the structure of the product market through
the creation of a Regulatory Council under Post Reform II restructur-
ing.  Through this council, for example, they ensured the adoption of a
high standard of universal service (of general ISDN availability) by the
end of 1995.  By establishing the general availability of a high level of
service as a matter of public policy, stakeholders had substantially
greater input into the product market structure than in the United
States, while simultaneously constraining the strategic options avail-
able to Telekom.
During the political negotiations over Post Reform II, the DPG
secured the right to bargain with Telekom in all of its subsidiaries,
which were in turn bound to negotiate with the DPG.  Through this
mechanism, the DPG constrained Telekom from even considering a
nonunion employment strategy (Darbishire 1997a).  Employee repre-
sentation on the Supervisory Board was made uniquely strong, even in
a German context, while employee concerns about the postprivatiza-
tion structure of works councils led to additional alterations.  These
included the initial extension of the three-tier, public-sector works
council structure to the privatized Telekom, as well as a higher number
of works councilors (Darbishire 1995).  Furthermore, the DPG secured
the continuation of the contractual rights of all its employees, including
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their impressive employment security guarantees (which apply to civil
servants, who constitute half of Telekom’s workforce, as well as to all
workers aged 40, with 15 years of service).  These rights have, in turn,
constrained Telekom from adopting a technological displacement strat-
egy and substantially downsizing its workforce.
The institutional constraints on Telekom’s labor market approach
are illustrated by the relative employment stability within the company.
Between 1984 and 1994, Telekom employment in West Germany was
virtually unchanged, with a decrease of only 4,000 from 191,000.
Total employment, including the former East German telephone work-
ers, stood at 225,435.  It was only in March 1995 that Telekom offi-
cially doubled its goal of eliminating 30,000 jobs throughout East and
West Germany to 60,000 (26 percent of the workforce) by the year
2000.
While the extent of potential technological displacement should
not be underestimated, Telekom’s underlying strategy has emphasized
a revenue-enhancing, up-market approach, with slow, heavily negoti-
ated change.  The emphasis on revenue generation rather than techno-
logical displacement, downsizing, or cost minimization is significant.
In contrast to the United States, where access lines per employee is the
standard performance measure, Telekom established a corporate objec-
tive of revenue per employee, set at DM 470,000.  This measure has
underlain Telekom’s strategy, substantially promoted by the DPG, of
seeking new employment opportunities rather than cutting costs.  By
mid 1995, the DPG presented Telekom with over 50 proposals of how
to generate new business to enhance employment security.  Telekom
took these proposals seriously, especially because of the downsizing
constraints it faced because the DPG had made employment security
its top priority.
The rights of the works councils—concerning the introduction of
new technology and restructuring of work, and the regrading of
employees, transfers, and appointments—required that Telekom work
cooperatively with the union.  For example, between June 1993 and
March 1994, the DPG negotiated a unique contract in response to the
proposed elimination of 11,000 posts under a restructuring program
known as Telekom Service 2000.  This contract guaranteed employ-
ment security to all workers affected by restructuring and specified
compensation for those adversely affected by the cost-cutting plan.  In
Telecommunications Services 45
late 1994, the DPG extended this contract (in negotiations over a
broader reorganization plan) to all workers, thereby guaranteeing com-
prehensive employment security until the end of June 1996.  Moreover,
Telekom’s plan to downsize by 60,000 was premised on the use of
expensive voluntary redundancy and early retirement packages.
The positive impact of these industrial relations on Telekom’s busi-
ness strategy was facilitated by the favorable regulatory environment
that Telekom enjoyed and the absence of countervailing financial mar-
ket pressures.  Rather than being constrained by asymmetric regulatory
structures from entering closely aligned market segments (as, for
example, AT&T was in the local market and the RBOCs were in the
cable TV market), Telekom continued to operate the largest cable TV
company in the world with a de facto monopoly and had 14.6 million
subscribers by the end of 1994.  Combined with the largest ISDN net-
work, these conditions provided Telekom with the potential for the
development of an integrated telecommunications services industry
and an up-market strategy generating new, high-quality businesses.
However, despite longer time horizons, a favorable regulatory cli-
mate, and the integration of DPG and works councils into decision
making, Telekom has continued to be slow in developing innovative
work practices or effective restructuring.  For example, management
viewed the lack of local autonomy as a principal deficit of its organiza-
tional structure and a division of the corporate structure needed to meet
differentiated customer demands.  Telekom initiated a project in 1993–
1994 to reorganize the company into three decentralized divisions
(serving business and residential customers, and managing the net-
work).  Although this model drew on successful U.S. and U.K. experi-
ence and involved substantial works council and union participation at
every stage, the reform proceeded in a slow, cautious, and centralized
manner.  This project included testing two competing models of corpo-
rate structure.  One, favored by Telekom management, was based prin-
cipally on market segments and another (favored by the DPG) on
geographic units (Darbishire 1997a).  The piloting of competing mod-
els indicates the strength of the union’s influence in seeking to mini-
mize the perceived negative effect of restructuring on union and worker
interests.
Unlike the slow pace of corporate restructuring, digitalization of
the network has led to substantial work reorganization and operational
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cost cutting.  As in the United States, this change involved a shift away
from functional organization, though significantly without any attempt
to increase the extent of Taylorism or machine pacing of work, as at
AT&T and the RBOCs.  Rather, digitalization occurred in the context
of intensive consultation and agreements with the central works coun-
cil, which utilized its codetermination rights to ensure that systems
capable of monitoring workers’ behavior have neither been used to do
that nor to intensify the pace of work.
In summary, rather than adopting a cost-minimization or labor-
intensification strategy, Telekom instead fully involved works councils
and the union in the process of restructuring.  As a result, it did not
experience the declines in morale or cooperative union–management
activity experienced in the United States.  Nevertheless, there have
been no decentralized workplace trials equivalent to those in the United
States.  Three factors contributed to this outcome.  First, Telekom was
slow to decentralize its operational structures, characteristic of its pub-
lic sector legacy.  This tardiness restricted its potential for workplace
innovation.  Second, the union and works councils were strongly
focused on the technological displacement and downsizing implica-
tions of restructuring.  Third, because employee representatives feared
that restructuring had the potential to undermine their position, they
attempted to minimize its downside by conducting highly detailed,
centralized negotiations about new work organization practices.
More generally, the restricted pattern of workplace innovation
reflects the radical nature of technological change in the telecommuni-
cations industry.  Although extensive worker and works council
involvement have promoted such innovation in industries experiencing
incremental changes in technology, in the telecommunications industry
the situation differs.  Workers perceive that technical changes will
undermine their existing skill sets as jobs become based more on
knowledge of software, clerical, and service skills.  Potential gains
from the transformation of work in the telecommunications industry
derive from new skill sets and cross-functional organizational integra-
tion as described in the AT&T and RBOC sections, not from building
on these workers’ existing craft skills (Darbishire 1997b; Lehrer and
Darbishire 1997).  The combination of strong worker rights, together
with a negative perception of the adjustment process, led to a more
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cautious restructuring of Telekom’s product market, although it gener-
ated a significantly different outcome in the labor market.
CONCLUSION
What lessons for mutual learning can be gained from these com-
parisons?  Several are noteworthy.  At the most basic level, the ability
of stakeholders to influence or control the pace of change significantly
affects the outcomes.  The weak institutional position of unions in the
AT&T case prevented them from slowing the course of change.  The
unions in the regional Bell cases did not have more power but could
leverage concern for consumer welfare to slow the pace of change.  By
contrast, the institutional power of the German unions allowed them to
significantly slow the pace to explicitly address labor’s concerns.  
The slower pace of restructuring in both the regional Bell and Tele-
kom cases provided a longer time horizon to develop a range of labor
adjustment strategies to meet the needs of both management and labor.
At a minimum, these strategies included softening the negative effect
on the displaced workforce through the use of attrition, voluntary sev-
erance, and early retirement programs.  These strategies also had posi-
tive “spillover” effects on the morale of the survivor workforce.  For
management, this positive effect on morale increased the likelihood
that the survivor workforce would play a more cooperative role in
ongoing restructuring.  Additionally, the longer time horizon provided
the needed time for retraining and redeployment, strategies that bene-
fited not only the incumbent workforce but management as well by
building on the embedded skill base rather than losing that base to
competitors.
By contrast, the faster, unconstrained approach allowed companies
to take advantage of the full implications of new technology and mar-
ket flexibility, both in terms of process and product innovation.  In the
United States, the most significant outcome of this decade of market-
driven restructuring has been to alter the fundamental purpose of the
telecommunications industry.  Its mission has changed from providing
an integrated universal service to the public and maintaining national
security to supporting national economic competitiveness in a global
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economy.  In general, then, the U.S. telecommunications industry has
outperformed its German counterpart in terms of speed of delivery,
response time, product diversity, and price reductions—both as an
input into other industries and as a direct contributor to national eco-
nomic growth.  However, employees bore the major costs of restructur-
ing through displacement, decline in morale, and ongoing employment
insecurity.  Labor market segmentation increased.  Unions lost power
and members.
In Germany, by contrast, the influence of government policymak-
ers, unions, and corporate stakeholders in slowing the pace of restruc-
turing prevented Telekom from taking advantage of the implications of
new technologies, limiting performance improvements for business
and residential consumers.  However, workers have not suffered the
kind of displacement, demoralization, or insecurity that U.S. workers
have faced.  Unions have retained membership levels as well as their
institutional power.  
These findings would argue for a classic story of the trade-offs
between consumer and worker welfare.  While in the short run, this
argument has some merit, the longer-term outcomes are far from cer-
tain.  First, to the extent that rapid, market-driven deregulation leads to
efficiency and innovation, corporate users and the national economy
more generally benefit.  Certainly, the United States continues to lead
the world in innovations in telecommunications technologies.  But it is
difficult to ascribe this positive outcome entirely to deregulation,
because the United States historically led the world in this field (Vietor
1989; Rosenberg 1994). 
Second, haste makes waste.  AT&T’s divestiture and deregulation
were premised on the assumption that new microwave technologies
would erode the natural monopoly argument in the telecommunica-
tions market.  However, the digitalization of network switching and
transmission systems substantially increased network economies of
scale and scope.  This has led some who are strongly pro-deregulation
to admit that technological efficiencies may lead to a recentralization
of the industry (Huber 1989).  The 1990s have confirmed some of these
worries, as merger activity has dominated the decade, exemplified by
the eight large local carriers at divestiture (the seven RBOCs and GTE)
that have merged into four.  In addition, some researchers have argued
that significant reductions in productivity growth have accompanied
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this period of duplication and overcapacity.  Using three different mea-
sures of productivity used in the industry,11 Keefe found that productiv-
ity growth in the 1984–1991 period (3.4 percent annually) was half that
of the 1974–1983 period (6.9 percent per year) and the 1951–1983
period (6 percent per year).  By the early 1990s, when AT&T served 60
percent of the long-distance market, MCI and Sprint together had the
capacity to meet the needs of the entire country (Keefe and Boroff
1994, pp. 321–322).  Moreover, while corporations benefited from
competition in the equipment industry, the U.S. economy suffered as
imports rose dramatically (from Canada’s Northern Telecom and Ger-
many’s Siemens).  U.S. manufacturers of telecommunications equip-
ment were decimated.
Third, the distribution of benefits to consumers in the United States
has been highly unequal.  Large business users have benefited the most.
Small business and residential consumers have also benefited through
greater product diversity and reductions in the price of long distance,
which offset price increases in basic service.  Notably, however, resi-
dential consumers were protected because regulators slowed the pace
of deregulation in local service.  Otherwise, basic rates would have
skyrocketed in the 1980s.  Low-end consumers fared worse under
deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s because basic rates rose and they
could not afford to take advantage of long-distance price reductions.
While new FCC regulations seek to ensure universal service as well as
Internet access to low-income residents, the implementation of regula-
tions will determine longer-term outcomes.
It is not only pace of change that matters, however.  As we have
argued, more fundamentally, the outcomes depend on the relative
power and strategic choices of institutional actors and stakeholders in
shaping the trajectory of deregulation and restructuring.  In the AT&T
case, the courts and regulators deliberately chose to reduce the profit-
ability of AT&T, and the company, unions, and consumers were
excluded from the decision-making process.  In the case of the regional
Bells, political embeddedness gave the companies, unions, and resi-
dential consumers a position to win politically favorable legislation
that tempered a free-market approach.  In the German case, institu-
tional stakeholders deliberately chose an approach to reregulation that
privileges Telekom by retaining its monopoly in telephony and cable
TV.  This choice provided the opportunity for a carefully managed,
50 Batt and Darbishire
integrated approach to restructuring and the provision of multimedia
services.  Although the EU may alter its adjustment path, Germany has
the potential to avoid duplicating its infrastructure as did the United
States, where the systemness of technology continues to favor econo-
mies of scale.  The German social market solution has the potential in
the long run to create mutual gains for firms, unions, employees, and
consumers.  Yet the promise is still to be fulfilled.
Finally, it is noteworthy that none of the approaches to reregulation
and restructuring has achieved a new system of “high-involvement”
work organization comparable to the innovative team-based or lean
production systems in manufacturing.  While more experimentation
has occurred in the United States, those experiments have been short-
lived, overcome by broad-scale cost-cutting initiatives.  Meanwhile,
Telekom and the German unions have positioned themselves for
greater labor–management cooperation in workplace innovations.
Rather than adopting a cost minimization or technological displace-
ment strategy, Telekom has focused on a revenue enhancement strat-
egy.  This has the potential to create a high-involvement approach to
work organization while limiting the ultimate costs and adjustment
burden borne by employees and the union.  Of key importance, how-
ever, is whether the cautious but sustained cooperative approach to
restructuring will produce performance gains in the long run.  The out-
come will itself be strongly influenced by the ability of stakeholders to
successfully implement changes to sustain the up-market strategy in
spite of ongoing downsizing and before new competitive entrants can
erode Telekom’s substantial market share.
Notes
1. Until 1984, AT&T, or the “Bell system,” was a regulated monopoly composed of
Bell Labs (the research and development arm); Western Electric (the equipment-
producing arm); AT&T long lines (the long-distance arms), and 22 local Bell
companies (the local service providers).  In response to a lawsuit filed by MCI,
which sought entry into AT&T markets, the courts dismantled the monopoly.
AT&T retained ownership of the equipment and long-distance subsidiaries but not
local service.  The 22 local phone companies were reorganized into seven regional
Bell operating companies (RBOCs) with monopoly control of local service; they
also jointly owned Bell Labs until 1996.
2. Source: author’s interviews with Bell company representatives.
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3. NYNEX comprises the New York and New England telephone companies.  It
merged with Bell Atlantic, which subsequently merged with GTE to form Veri-
zon.  In this chapter, we refer to the company as NYNEX because the material is
specific to NYNEX before it merged with Bell Atlantic.
4. AT&T unsuccessfully led a coalition of consumers, unions, independent tele-
phone companies, and state PUCs.
5. Taylorism, after Frederick Taylor, refers to the practice of using time and motion
studies to separate thought from execution and break down complex jobs into nar-
row repetitive tasks to improve efficiency.
6. Source: author’s interviews with management and union officials.
7. Moreover, heightened transaction costs and consumer confusion, for example, are
a consequence of the package deals to consumers (such as MCI’s Friends and
Family and AT&T’s Reach Out and True Voice).  This trend is in sharp contrast to
current theories of quality in customer service that argue that customer loyalty and
longevity are the key to competitiveness (Schlesinger and Heskett 1991a, 1991b).
8. A 1996 union election replaced the long-standing CWA district leadership with a
leadership team more open to joint strategies, but the company was focused on
merger activity (with Bell Atlantic and GTE).  Contract negotiations in 1998 and
2001 were settled only after a strike.
9. For a fuller account of the unions’ use of the state utility commission to curb cor-
porate behavior, see Katz, Batt, and Keefe (2000).
10. Having amounted to 30 percent in 1990 and 25 percent in 1992, the reserve asset
ratio was projected to fall to 18 percent by 1994.
11. These measures are average annual increases in access lines per employee hour, in
switched minutes per employee hour, and in adjusted revenue per employee hour.
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